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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102 & 78A-4-103 to 
review the District Court's decision and order denying Plaintiff/Appellant, Greg 
Torgerson's (hereinafter "Torgerson") Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment or 
Order. 
Issues Presented for Review 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Torgerson's Rule 60 
Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order? 
Standard of Review 
A district court's decision to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Bodell Construction v. Robbins, 2014 
UT App. 203,334 P.3d 1004, 1007 (Ut.Ct.App.2014). 
Preservation of the Issues 
The issues raised in Torgerson's brief were preserved in Torgerson's Rule 60 
Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order, Defendant/Appellee, Estate of Bret Kouns' 
(hereinafter "Kouns Estate") response thereto, Torgerson's reply briefs and the hearing 
held on said motion. 
Determinative Statutes, Rules, and Ordinances 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from 
oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the 
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record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice. After a 
notice of appeal has been filed and while the appeal is pending, the mistake may be 
corrected only with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi~ence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal 
representative from a judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(b)(l) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(b )(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
(b)(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an opposing party; 
(b )( 4) the judgment is void; 
(b)(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(b )(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
( c) Timing and effect of the motion. A motion under paragraph (b) must be filed within 
a reasonable time and for reasons in paragraph (b)(l), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days 
after entry of the judgment or order or, if there is no judgment or order, from the date of 
the proceeding. The motion does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. 
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( d) Other power to grant relief. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain 
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Statement of the Case 
On April 19, 2016, the District Court for the Sixth District Court, State of Utah, 
Sevier County issued judgment permitting the Kouns Estate to lease certain real property 
in which Torgerson claims an interest to an individual named Josh Talbot. The judgment 
was a default judgment in that Torgerson was not present at the April 18, 2016 hearing 
held by the District Court. The judgment effectively terminated Torgerson's interest in 
the real property in question. 
Torgerson immediately filed a motion for relief from the default judgment under 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was fully briefed by the 
parties and a hearing was held before the Honorable Wallace A. Lee on July 11, 2016. 
The District Court issued its decision denying Torgerson's motion on August 15, 2016. 
In its decision, the District Court held that Torgerson failed to establish sufficient 
diligence to warrant relief under Rule 60 and that Torgerson did not have a meritorious 
defense to the Kouns Estate's position in that Torgerson' s claim to the real property in 
question was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804(2), which requires a claimant in a 
probate matter to commence an action to enforce the claim within sixty (60) days after 
the claim has been denied by the probate estate. 
Torgerson timely appealed the District Court's decision to this Court. 
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Statement of Facts 
The following facts are relevant to this appeal: ~ 
1. Bret Kouns passed away on June 10, 2015. (Record on Appeal ("ROA") 
#000001); 
2. Prior to his passmg, Mr. Kouns entered into a senes of agreements with 
Torgerson, which gave Torgerson certain leasehold and ownership rights to real 
property owned by Mr. Kouns at that time of his passing. (ROA #000027-29 & 
#000294-300); 
3. On June 19, 2015, Pam Peterson (hereinafter "Peterson") filed an Application for 
lnfomal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative. (ROA 
#000001-4 ); 
4. Peterson was appointed Personal Representative of the Kouns Estate on July 8, 
2015. (ROA #000016-17); 
5. Torgerson filed a claim against the Kouns Estate on October 7, 2015 asserting a 
leasehold/ownership interest in property owned by the Kouns Estate. (ROA 
#000027-29); 
6. Torgerson's claim was filed prose; 
7. The Kouns Estate filed a denial of Torgerson's claim on October 9, 2015. (ROA 
#000030-31); 
8. The Kouns Estate filed a Petition for Court Approval of Agriculture Lease and 
Option to Sell Estate Property (hereinafter "Petition") on March 10, 2016 seeking 
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to lease and sell property in which Torgerson claims an interest to an individual 
named Josh Talbot. (ROA #000032-45); 
9. Torgerson, by and through his newly retained attorney, Lloyd Rickenbach, filed a 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on March 24, 2016 seeking a declaration 
from the District Court that Torgerson had a leasehold/ownership interest in the 
real property that was the subject of the Kouns Estate's Petition; 
10. The District Court treated the Declaratory Judgment Act Complaint as an 
objection to the Petition. (ROA #000313); 
11. The District Court scheduled a hearing on the Petition for April 18, 2016. (ROA 
#000063-64); 
12. Torgerson was not given notice of the April 18, 2016 by the District Court. (ROA 
#000064); 
13. Torgerson's attorney, Lloyd Rickenbach, was not given notice of the April 18, 
2016 hearing by the District Court. (ROA #000064); 
14. On Saturday, April 16, 2016, Lloyd Rickenbach, while filing an Entry of 
Appearance on behalf of Torgerson in the Kouns Estate case, discovered that a 
hearing had been set for April 18, 2016. (ROA #000301); 
15. Lloyd Rickenbach resides in the State of Arizona and was in Arizona when he 
discovered the April 18, 2016 hearing date. (ROA #000351); 
16. Lloyd Rickenbach had a prior family commitment scheduled for April 18, 2016 in 
Arizona and was not able to attend the hearing in Richfield, Utah. (ROA 
#000302); 
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17. Lloyd Rickenbach immediately filed a Motion to Continue the April 18, 2016 
hearing. (ROA #107-09); 
18. The Motion to Continue was filed on April 16, 2016, the day Lloyd Rickenbach 
discovered the existence of the April 18, 2016 hearing date. (ROA #000107-09); 
19. The District Court held the hearing on April 18, 2016, denied the Motion to 
Continue and granted a default judgment on the Petition in favor of the Kouns 
Estate. (ROA #000111-13 & #000122-23); 
20. The Default Judgment was entered by the District Court on April 19, 2016. (ROA 
#000122-23); 
21. The Default Judgment effectively terminated Torgerson's rights to the subject real 
property; 
22. Torgerson, by and through Lloyd Rickenbach, filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief 
from Judgment or Order on April 19, 2016 asserting, inter alia, that proper notice 
of the April 18, 2016 hearing was not given. (ROA #000126-29); 
23. In its opposing brief, the Kouns Estate, in an affidavit executed by the Kouns 
Estate's attorney's assistant, Jill Miles, asserted that notice had been given to 
Lloyd Rickenbach via a mailing dated March 30, 2016. (ROA #000229-30); 
24. There was no Certificate of Service evidencing the March 30, 2016 mailing filed 
contemporaneously with the District Court; 
25. The only evidence of said mailing was Jill Miles affidavit filed in response to 
Torgerson's Rule 60 motion; 
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26. Lloyd Rickenbach, in an affidavit executed in support of a Reply Brief filed by the 
undersigned counsel, asserted that he did not receive the alleged mailing from Jill 
Miles. (ROA #000301-02); 
27. A hearing was held on Torgerson's Rule 60 motion on July 11, 2016. (ROA 
#000304-307); 
28. Lloyd Rickebach testified in open court on July 11, 2016 that he did not receive 
the alleged mailing from Jill Miles. (ROA #000351 ); 
29. The District Court issued its decision denying Torgerson's Rule 60 motion on 
August 15, 2016. (ROA #000309-331); 
30. Torgerson timely appealed the District Court's decision. (ROA #000334-35). 
Summary of Argument 
In its decision, the District Court held that: (1) Torgerson did not exercise 
sufficient diligence to warrant relief under Rule 60; and (2) Torgerson does not have a 
meritorious defense to the Kouns Estate Petition because his claim is time barred under 
the Utah Probate Code. The District Court's decision is in error. 
The diligence required under Rule 60 does not rise to the level of "due diligence" 
or "perfect diligence." Jones v. Layton/Ok/and, 2009 UT 39, 214 P.3d 859, 863 
(Ut.2009). All that is required is that the moving party show some diligence. Id The 
facts in this case more than demonstrate the requisite diligence under Rule 60. 
It is unquestioned that neither Torgerson nor his attorney, Lloyd Rickenbach, 
received notice of the April 18, 2016 hearing. (ROA #000064). It is also unquestioned 
that Lloyd Rickenbach moved to continue the hearing immediately after filing his Entry 
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of Appearance in the Kouns Estate matter. (ROA #000107-109). To counter these 
unquestioned facts, the District Court relies almost exclusively on the Jill Miles alleged 
March 30, 2016 mailing. Such reliance is, however, misplaced. 
The only proof of the March 30, 2016 mailing is Jill Miles' self-serving affidavit 
attached to the Kouns Estate's opposition to Torgerson's Rule 60 motion. (ROA 
#000229-30). There is no contemporaneously filed Certificate of Service and there is no 
proof of receipt from either the United States Post Office or any other postal courier. In 
short, the only proof of the mailing is Jill Miles' after-the-fact statement. Her statement 
stands in stark contrast to the statements made by Lloyd Rickenbach, an officer of the 
court, in both an affidavit and in open court, that the alleged mailing was not received. 
The District Court also erred when it held that Torgerson's claim to the subject 
real property was time barred. Torgerson's claim is a claim for specific performance. He 
is asserting that he has a right to continue leasing the property and, thereafter, purchase 
the same. "The term 'claim' found in [ the Probate Code] does not include a claim for 
specific performance .... " In Re Estate of Sharp, 537 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Ut.1975). 
Torgerson's claim cannot, therefore, be time barred by the Probate Code. 
Argument 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 
TORGERSON'S RULE 60 MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR 
ORDER 
A. Torgerson' s acted with sufficient diligence to warrant relief under Rule 60 
10 
Torgerson brought his Rule 60 motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. "For a district court to set aside a default judgment pursuant to 
Rule 60(b ), 'a defendant must show: ( i) that the judgment was entered against him 
through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in Rule 60(b)), (ii) that his 
motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and (iii) that he has a meritorious defense to 
the action."' Bodell Construction v. Robbins, 334 P.3d at 1007. "A district court has 
broad discretion to rule on a motion to set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b )" Id 
This discretion is not, however, unlimited. Davis v. Goldsworthy, 602 UT App. 145, 184 
P.3d 626, 629 (Ut.Ct.App.2008). 
The District Court held that Torgerson failed to establish excusable neglect. 
"[T]here is no specific legal test for excusable neglect." Jones v. Layton/Ok/and, 214 
P.3d at 863. "The equitable nature of the excusable neglect determination requires that a 
district court be free to consider all facts it deems relevant to its decision and weigh them 
accordingly." Id The excusable part of excusable negligence imposes upon the moving 
party "some evidence of diligence in order to justify relief." Id The diligence required 
under Rule 60 does not, however, rise to the level of "due diligence" or "perfect 
diligence." All that is required is that the moving party show some diligence. Torgerson 
demonstrated the level of diligence required to obtain relief under Rule 60(b ). 
The objective facts in this case show that: (1) neither Torgerson nor his attorney, 
Lloyd Rickenbach, were given notice of the April 18, 2016 hearing; and (2) immediately 
upon filing his Entry of Appearance in the Kouns Estate case, Lloyd Rickenbach, on 
behalf of Torgerson, filed a motion to continue the hearing. The significance of these 
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facts is that there was no way for either Torgerson or his attorney to know of the hearing 
absent Jill Miles' disputed alleged March 30, 2016 mailing. 
The alleged March 30, 2016 mailing is suspect, at best. The only proof of the 
disputed mailing is Jill Miles' after-the-fact affidavit. There was no Certificate of Service 
filed by the Kouns Estate contemporaneously with the alleged mailing and the alleged 
and disputed mailing was not sent via any means requiring proof of service on the 
recipient. Logic would dictate that if the Kouns Estate mailed the notice "out of an 
abundance of caution," as the District Court states, some steps would have been taken to 
prove that the notice was actually mailed and received by Torgerson or his attorney. No 
such steps were taken and the alleged and disputed mailing stands in direct contrast to the 
affidavit and testimony of Lloyd Rickenbach, an officer of the court, that he did not 
receive any such delivery. 
Absent the alleged mailing, there is no evidence that Torgerson, either personally 
or through his attorney, had notice of the April 18, 2016 hearing. The District Court 
implies that by virtue of the filing of the Declaratory Judgment Act Complaint, Torgerson 
and his attorney would have been put on notice of the hearing. This implication ignores 
the reality of the District Court's electronic filing system. A notice of hearing in the 
Kouns Estate would not have been apparent in the Declaratory Judgment Act case and 
Torgerson' s attorney would not have had access to the Kouns Estate case until his Entry 
of Appearance was actually filed, on April 16, 2016. 
The District Court also states that Lloyd Rickenbach had ample opportunity to 
attend the hearing, even if notice of said hearing was received on April 16, 2016. This 
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statement ignores two important facts. One, two days would have been insufficient for an 
adequate defense to the Kouns Estate Petition to be mounted by Torgerson. Two, a fact 
apparently lost on the District Court, Lloyd Rickenbach resides in the State of Arizona 
and was in Arizona on April 16, 2016. It would have been virtually impossible for Lloyd 
Rickenbach to arrange transportation to Richfield and prepare for the hearing in less than 
a day and a half, notwithstanding that Lloyd Rickenbach had a prior commitment in 
Arizona scheduled for the 18th• 
It should also be noted that the District Court stated in its decision that it set the 
hearing after it had become aware of the Declaratory Judgment Act case and the purpose 
of the hearing was to give all parties an opportunity to be heard. Given this purpose, it 
would seem imperative that the District Court should take all necessary steps to insure all 
parties received notice, and upon finding out that such notice was not given, taken steps 
to remedy the error. In this case, grant Torgeron's Rule 60 motion. 
Under the circumstances described herein, Torgerson more than demonstrated the 
diligence required to obtain relief under Rule 60. 
B. Torgerson has a meritorious defense to the Kouns Estate Petition. 
The purpose of the Kouns Estate Petition was to obtain authorization from the 
District Court to lease and sell certain real property owned by the Estate to an individual 
named Josh Talbot. The property to be leased and sold was the same property in which 
Torgerson claimed an interest via the agreements between Mr. Kouns and Torgerson 
executed when Mr. Kouns was still alive. Togerson's claim was a claim for specific 
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performance of the agreements and the Kouns Estate Petition was an attempt to quiet 
title. The default judgment in question quieted title in favor of the Kouns Estate. 
The District Court acknowledged that Torgerson was not required to prove his 
case on a Rule 60 motion. The District Court also acknowledged the existence of 
photocopied checks, two short lease agreements and other available evidence that 
Torgerson would rely upon to prove his right to the real property in question. The 
District Court held, however, that this evidence was irrelevant because of the "elephant in 
the room." The "elephant in the room," according to the District Court, was Torgerson's 
failure to commence an action to enforce his claim within sixty (60) days after the Kouns 
Estate denied the claim. The District Court held that this failure permanently barred 
Torgerson's claim leaving him without a meritorious defense to the Kouns Estate 
Petition. 
There was no "elephant in the room." While the Probate Code does require the 
timely commencement of an action to enforce a claim, the claim being asserted by 
Torgerson is not subject to this requirement. "The term 'claim' found in [the Probate 
Code] does not include a claim for specific performance, but refers to debts or demands 
against the decedent which might have been enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions 
for the recovery of money; and upon which only a money judgment could have been 
rendered." In Re Estate of Sharp, 537 at 1037. 
Torgerson's claim is one of specific performance in that he is seeking to force the 
Kouns Estate to honor his right to continue to lease and, ultimately, purchase the real 
property in question. In short, Torgerson is seeking to force the Kouns Estate to honor 
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the wishes of Mr. Kouns and sell the subject property to Torgerson. Torgerson's prose 
"claim" filed in the probate case does not, by virtue of the filing, transform his claim for 
specific performance into a claim subject to the time requirements set forth in the Probate 
Code. 
The sole basis for the District Court's determination that Torgerson did not have a 
meritorious defense to the Kouns Estate Petition was that Torgerson's claim was time 
barred by the provisions of the Probate Code. As set forth herein, Torgerson's claim for 
specific performance is not subject to the time requirements of the Probate Code. 
Accordingly, Torgerson's claim is not time barred and his meritorious defense to the 
Petition is available and needs to be considered. 
Conclusion 
A dispute clearly existed between the Kouns Estate and Torgerson with regard to 
the subject property that needed to be resolved before the proposed lease to Josh Talbot 
could be executed. The preferred method under Utah law to resolve the dispute between 
the Kouns Estate and Torgerson would be for the Court to hear evidence presented by 
both parties and, based upon this evidence, determine the rights of the parties in the 
subject property. Basically, provide each party with their "day in court." Both parties 
were not, however, given their "day in court." Due to circumstances beyond his control, 
Torgerson was not given proper notice of the scheduled April 18, 2016 hearing and did 
not, therefore, appear, either personally or through counsel. Default judgment was 
entered against him and his rights in the subject property were terminated. 
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"The law disfavors default judgments . . . [ and courts] . . . should incline towards 
granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the parties may have a hearing." Davis v. 
Goldsworthy, 184 P .3d at 629. Rule 60 is the mechanism that courts utilize to relieve 
parties from undesired default judgments. The circumstances surrounding Torgerson' s 
failure to appear at the April 18, 2016 are such that entitle him to relief from the default 
judgment in question. Accordingly, and for the reasons to be set forth herein, the District 
Court's decision should be reversed and the case remanded to allow Torgeron to present 
evidence of his entitlement to the property to the District CoUJ't. 
Respectfully submitted by, ~-~~ 
Michael P. Van Tassell 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(t)(1) 
I, Michael P. Van Tassell, certify that this document, Brief of Appellant, complies 
with the Court's type-volume limitations and contains 3,872 words according to the word 
processing software used to prepare this document. 
~/.7~~ 
Michael P. Van Tassell 
No Addendum 
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